The paper discusses how current in ‡ation targeting should be modeled, and argues that it is better represented as a commitment to a targeting rule (a rule specifying operational objectives for monetary policy or a condition for the target variables), than as a commitment to a simple instrument rule (like a Taylor rule).
Introduction
In ‡ation targeting was introduced in New Zealand in 1990, so by now we have about 10 years of experience. It spread very quickly to an increasing number of countries: Canada 1991, the UK 1992, Sweden, Finland and Australia 1993. The Czech Republic was the …rst transition economy to introduce in ‡ation targeting, and Brazil was the …rst developing country to introduce full‡edged in ‡ation targeting. Israel and Chile have gradually developed into in ‡ation targeters. Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. 1 Except for research on the bene…cial consequences of central-bank independence and low in ‡ation, and academic advice by Charles Goodhart on the incentive structure for the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, in ‡ation targeting was introduced in early 1990s without any preceding speci…c academic research on in ‡ation targeting. The credit for the initial rise of in ‡ation targeting goes mostly to insightful central-bank and …nance-department o¢cials rather than academics. Once in ‡ation targeting was introduced in the mid 1990s, though, an increasing number of academics started to do research on the topic, and by now there is large volume of accumulated research, and the number of papers and books on in ‡ation targeting is growing fast.
Recent additions in Europe include
How should we de…ne in ‡ation targeting? I believe it is useful to emphasize three characteristics: (1) There is a numerical in ‡ation target, in the form of either a point target (with or without a tolerance interval) or a target range. This numerical in ‡ation target refers to a speci…c price index. Achieving the in ‡ation target is the primary objective of monetary policy, although there is room for additional secondary objectives, as we shall see. There is no other nominal anchor, like an exchange-rate target or a money-growth target. (2) The decision-making process can be described as "in ‡ation-forecast targeting," in the sense that the central bank's in ‡ation forecast has a prominent role and the instrument is set such that the in ‡ation forecast conditional in the instrument-setting is consistent with the target. This does not exclude that output and output-gap forecasts also enter in an essential way, as we shall see. (3) There is a high degree (an exceptionally high degree, by historical standards) of transparency and accountability. The central bank is accountable for achieving the in ‡ation target and provides transparent and explicit monetary-policy reports presenting its forecasts and explaining and motivating its policy.
However, these days many countries call themselves in ‡ation targeters without seeming to take the in ‡ation targeting very seriously. Indeed, an institutional commitment to in ‡ation targeting appears essential for in ‡ation targeting to have much meaning. Such an institutional commitment involves (1) a clear (preferably legislated) mandate for a monetary policy directed towards low in ‡ation, (2) central-bank independence ("instrument independence," meaning independence in setting the monetary-policy instrument, in some cases also independence in formulating an operational interpretation of the low-in ‡ation mandate), and (3) accountability of the central bank for achieving the mandate.
By now a large amount of research has been done on in ‡ation targeting and related research topics. There has been work on institutions and political economics, for instance on governance, independence, delegation, accountability, decision-making in committees, and the role of transparency for incentives. There has been work on many aspects of the transmission mechanism, including aggregate supply/Phillips curves, aggregate demand/IS curves, the credit channel and the …nancial accelerator, the impact of asset prices, the term structure of interest rates, the role of money, and the …scal theory of the price level. There has been work on monetary-policy objectives, including the relation between in ‡ation and economic growth, targeting in ‡ation versus alternatives (the price level, nominal GDP, money growth, exchange rates, etc.), ‡exible versus strict in ‡ation targeting (to what extent in ‡ation targeting includes concerns about the real economy, the output gap, interest rates, and the exchange rate), the relation between social welfare (utility of the representative consumer) and the frequently used quadratic loss functions representing in ‡ation targeting, and the role of interest-rate stabilization/smoothing. A good part of the research has been on monetary-policy rules, including whether commitment or discretion is the realistic assumption, properties of simple instrument rules, especially Taylor-type rules, and the relation between instrument rules and targeting rules (to be de…ned). There has been work on monetary policy under uncertainty, for instance, on partial information about state of the world, certainty-equivalence, optimal estimation and control; on model uncertainty, Brainard-type multiplicative uncertainty, robust control versus Bayesian control; and on whether uncertainty implies more cautious or more aggressive policy. There has been work on the role of transparency and credibility for successful in ‡ation targeting. A research area of enormous practical importance, given the deteriorating economic situation in Japan, concerns avoiding and escaping from liquidity traps and de ‡ation, and handling the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Much recent work has focused explicitly on in ‡ation targeting in open economies, including the choice of the optimal target index the role of the exchange-rate. The pros and cons of in ‡ation targeting in developing economies and transition economies is an increasingly important research area (Amato and Gerlach, 2002) .
There is no way I can cover this massive amount of work in a short paper. Instead I will focus on one controversial issue, where I have done some research of my own (especially in Svensson, 2001b) , namely how to model in ‡ation targeting: more speci…cally, what the policy rule is, and whether this policy rule is best seen as an instrument rule or a targeting rule. 2
How to model in ‡ation targeting?
There is by now widespread agreement among central bankers and academics that in ‡ation targeting in practice is " ‡exible" in ‡ation targeting (see, for instance, several contributions in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1996 and 1999): The objective is to stabilize in ‡ation around the in ‡ation target, but also to put some weight on stabilizing the output gap, the di¤erence between actual output and the "natural" output level, potential output (the level of output that would result with ‡exible prices). Such an objective can be described by a quadratic intertemporal loss function in period t,
where ± (0 < ± < 1) is a discount factor, E t denotes expectations conditional on information available in period t, ¼ t and x t denote in ‡ation and the output gap in period t, respectively, ¼ ¤ is the in ‡ation target, and¸> 0 is the relative weight on output-gap stabilization. Thus, in ‡ation and the output gap are the "target variables," that is, the variables that enter the loss function. The corresponding "target levels" are ¼ ¤ and zero. The zero target level for the output gap corresponds to an output target equal to potential output. There is general agreement that in ‡ation-targeting central banks do normally not have overambitious output targets, that is, exceeding potential output. Thus, discretionary optimization does not result in average in ‡ation bias, counter to the case in the standard Kydland-Prescott-Barro-Gordon setup. Since the in ‡ation target is subject to choice but not the output target, there is an asymmetry between the in ‡ation and output target, consistent with the in ‡ation target being the "primary objective." 3
Regarding the two parameters, ± and¸, the discount factor is for all practical purposes likely to very close to one, especially when a quarterly model is used. Interestingly, when the discount factor approaches one, the limit of the intertemporal loss function is the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of in ‡ation and the output gap,
(when the unconditional mean of in ‡ation and the output gap equal the in ‡ation target and zero,
. As mentioned, ‡exible in ‡ation targeting corresponds to¸> 0. "Strict" in ‡ation targeting would be the unrealistic case of¸= 0.
Commitment to a simple instrument rule
How do and should in ‡ation-targeting central banks achieve the in ‡ation target and minimize the loss function? Most of the literature discusses this in terms of a commitment to a simple reaction function, a simple "instrument rule," where the central bank mechanically sets its instrument rate (usually a short interest rate like a one-or two-week repurchase rate), i t , as a given simple function of a small subset of the information available to the central bank. Although several di¤erent simple instrument rules have been discussed since the 1970s, the best known and most discussed is the Taylor (1993) rule, a frequent variant of which can be written
where the response coe¢cients f ¼ , f x and f i ful…ll f ¼ > 0, f x > 0 and 0 · f i · 1 (although cases with f i > 1 have also been discussed) and ¹ r is the average real interest rate. A large volume of research, for instance in Taylor (1999) , has examined the properties of (2.3) and its variants in di¤erent models, with respect to determinacy of equilibria, performance measured by (2.2), robustness to di¤erent models, etc. Several papers have also estimated empirical reaction functions of this type.
The advantages of a simple instrument rule like (2.3) are: (1) The rule can easily be veri…ed by outside observers and a commitment to the rule would therefore be technically feasible.
(2) Variants of the Taylor rule have been found to be relatively robust to di¤erent models, in the sense that they perform reasonably well (in terms of (2.2)) in simulations with di¤erent models and rarely result in very bad outcomes (although these simulations have disregarded the important role of central-bank "judgment," to be discussed below).
The disadvantages are: (1) The rule will not result in an optimal outcome, for several reasons.
For instance, it responds only to a small subset of the information about the economy available to the central bank, and it only imperfectly allows for "history dependence." 4 (2) More speci…cally, because of the simplicity of the rule, there will be many situations when good judgment calls for deviations from the rule. Indeed, Taylor (1993) to a large extent discusses sensible discretionary departures from the rule. But then the rule is incomplete, since it provides no rule for departures from the rule. (3) In spite of all the research and discussion of the Taylor rule, no central bank has made a commitment to follow it. Instead of mechanical instrument-rate decisions, in ‡ation-targeting central banks have set up very elaborate decision-making processes, where huge amounts of information are collected and processed, and conditional forecasts of in ‡ation and output or the output-gap are constructed and contemplated, before an instrument-rate decision is made (Brash, 2001, and Svensson, 2001a) . (4) Empirical estimates of Taylor-type reaction functions show that they at most explain 2/3 of the empirical instrument-rate changes (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998) . Thus, central banks in practice deviate substantially from such a reaction function. Furthermore, a good empirical …t would still be consistent with the reaction function being the endogenous reduced-form outcome of a complex central-bank decision process rather than a commitment that is the beginning and the end of the process.
Commitment to a targeting rule
I …nd a commitment to a simple instrument rule unsuitable both as description of and prescription for in ‡ation targeting. Instead, I believe in ‡ation targeting is better described and prescribed as a commitment to a "targeting rule." 5 I …nd it practical to distinguish between "general" and "speci…c" targeting rules. A general targeting rule speci…es the objectives for monetary policy in an operational way, that is, speci…es an operational loss function. A commitment to a general targeting rule is hence a commitment to minimize such a loss function.
Such a commitment is often taken as given by researchers modeling optimal policy, for instance in the Kydland-Prescott-Barro-Gordon-Rogo¤ tradition. However, in practical monetary policy, making the objectives operational and explicit, is a large step compared to previous ad hoc policies. Getting the objectives straight and creating an institutional commitment to those objectives are crucial contributions of in ‡ation targeting.
A speci…c targeting rule is a commitment to set the instrument rate so as to achieve a speci…c target criterion for the target variables. The Bank of England and Sweden's Riksbank have formulated a simple speci…c targeting rule to guide policy, which can be expressed as "set interest-rates so the in ‡ation forecast about two years ahead is on target" (Goodhart, 2001, and Heikensten, 1999) . Although this speci…c targeting rule is both simple and operational, it is not necessarily optimal. An optimal speci…c targeting rule expresses the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables in an operational way.
As an example (from Svensson, 2001b , where the details are explained), consider a variant of the popular New Keynesian model, where in ‡ation and the output gap are predetermined one period (a small concession to realism relative to the standard variant when both in ‡ation and the output gap are treated as forward-looking variables, jump variables) and, in particular, "judgment" matters. The aggregate-supply/Phillips curve is
where ¼ t+2jt denotes expectations in period t of in ‡ation in period t + 2, etc., ® x is a positive constant, ® z is a row vector, and z t+1 is a column vector (of the same dimension), the "deviation", to be explained below. Thus, in ‡ation in period t + 1 is determined by expectations in period t of in ‡ation in period t + 2 and of the output gap in period t + 1 and by the deviation in period t + 1. The aggregate-demand/IS curve is
where¯x is a positive constant, i t+1jt is the expectation in period t of the nominal interest rate in period t + 1 and¯z is a row vector. Thus, the output gap in period t + 1 is determined by expectations in period t of the output gap in period t + 2 of the output gap in period t + 2 and of the real interest rate in period t + 1 and by the deviation in period t + 1.
The deviation represents the di¤erence between the true model and this simpli…ed New Keynesian model and includes all other determinants of in ‡ation and the output gap. For simplicity it is treated as an exogenous variable. The central bank's "judgment," z t´f z t+¿;t g 1 ¿ =0 , is the central bank's best forecast of the deviation. This is a way to represent the importance and inevitability of judgment in monetary policy. Conditional on the central bank's judgment, the bank's forecasting model in period t is then given by ¼ t+¿;t = ¼ t+¿ +1;t + ® x x t+¿;t + ® z z t+¿;t ; (2.6) x t+¿;t = x t+¿ +1;t ¡¯x(i t+¿;t ¡ ¼ t+¿ +1;t ) +¯zz t+¿;t ; (2.7)
for forecast horizons ¿¸1 (where ¼ t+¿;t refers to the central bank's ¿ -period-ahead forecast of in ‡ation in period t, etc.).
The optimal speci…c targeting rule for the loss function (2.1) and the model (2.6) and (2. 7) can then be found by …nding the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) and substitution (MRS) between (the forecasts of) the target variables (in ‡ation and the output gap), and setting these equal. A marginal increase in in ‡ation two periods ahead only, d¼ t+2;t > 0, d¼ t+j;t = 0, j 6 = 2, by the aggregate-supply relation (2.6) requires a fall in the output gap one period ahead, dx t+1;t = ¡ d¼ t+2;t =® x < 0, and an equal increase in the output gap two periods ahead, dx t+2;t = ¡ dx t+1;t > 0. We can then de…ne the marginal rate of transformation of the linear combinationx t+1;t´( x t+1;t ; x t+2;t )´(1; ¡ 1)x t+1;t into ¼ t+2;t , MRT(¼ t+2;t ;x t+1;t ), which will equal MRT(¼ t+2;t ;x t+1;t )´d
From the loss function (2.1) (when the forecasts enter as arguments) follows that the marginal rate of substitution of ¼ t+2;t for x t+j;t is given by MRS(¼ t+2;t ; x t+j;t )´d¼ t+2;t =dx t+j;t j dL t =0 = ¡¸x t+j;t =(¼ t+2;t ¡ ¼ ¤ ) (in the limit when ± ! 1, for simplicity). From this it is easy to show that the marginal rate of substitution of ¼ t+2;t for the above linear combinationx t+1;t , MRS(¼ t+2;t ;x t+1;t ), will be given by MRS(¼ t+2;t ;x t+1;t )´d ¼ t+2;t dx t+1;t¯d Lt=0;dx t+2;t =¡ dx t+1;t =¸(
Redoing this for ¼ t+¿;t for all ¿¸1 and setting the marginal rates of transformation equal to the marginal rates of substitution leads to the optimal speci…c targeting rule,
where x t;t for ¿ = 1 is understood to be x t;t¡1 , the one-period-ahead forecast of the output gap in period t ¡ 1. Thus, the optimal targeting rule in this example can be expressed as "…nd an instrument-rate path so the in ‡ation-gap forecast is ¡¸=® x times the change in the output-gap forecast." 6
In this example, optimal "in ‡ation-forecast targeting" can then be described as follows: (1) Conditional on the judgment z t´f z t+¿;t g 1 ¿ =0 , …nd in ‡ation and output gap forecasts, ¼ tf ¼ t+¿;t g 1 ¿ =1 and x t´f x t+¿;t g 1 ¿ =1 , that ful…ll the speci…c targeting rule (2.8) and the aggregatesupply relation (2.6). (2) Conditional on the judgment and these forecasts, …nd the instrumentrate forecast, i t´f i t+¿;t g 1 ¿ =0 , that ful…lls the aggregate-demand relation (2.7). (3) Announce these forecasts and set the instrument-rate accordingly. This results in the optimal instrumentrate setting, conditional on the judgment, z t , without having to specify the optimal reaction function. As is shown in Svensson (2001b) , even for this relatively simple model, the optimal reaction function is overwhelmingly complex, especially since it must specify how to respond optimally to judgment, making veri…ability and commitment directly to the optimal reaction function completely unrealistic.
The advantages of an optimal speci…c targeting rule like (2.8) are: (1) With published forecasts of the target variables, it is possible to verify whether the target rule is followed, since the targeting rule is relatively simple. Then commitment to the targeting rule is possible.
(2) The optimal speci…c targeting rule results in the fully optimal outcome, corresponding to commitment in a timeless perspective. (3) The speci…c targeting rule is relatively robust, in that it only depends on the marginal tradeo¤s between the target variables, that is, the derivatives of the loss function and the aggregate-supply relation with respect to the target variables. (4) The speci…c targeting rule is independent of judgment, in the sense of judgment not entering the targeting rule explicitly, but still allows the incorporation of judgment, since judgment enters in the forecasts.
A potential disadvantage, however, is that a speci…c targeting rule, in order to be optimal, depends on the precise marginal rate of transformation, the dynamic tradeo¤, between the target variables. Therefore, it is not robust to di¤erent models of the aggregate-supply relation (Svensson 2001b compares the optimal speci…c targeting rule for a backward-looking and a forward-looking model). Thus, it is clearly less robust than a commitment to a general targeting rule (but still much more robust than a commitment to the optimal instrument rule). an optimal targeting rule expresses the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and the marginal rates of substitution between the target variables in an operational way. I hope there will be more research along these lines in the future.
Conclusions
In ‡ation targeting is an active and lively research area. It is also an area where academic research matters for practical policy. In ‡ation-targeting central banks are eager to apply new research …ndings, and the distance between research and practice is very short. There is considerable cooperation between academic researchers and researcher at central banks-indeed, some of the best work in the area has been done at some central banks. Many unresolved issues remain, though. The limited space here has only allowed me to touch on one such issue.
